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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND DETERMINISM:
SUSTAINING THE CONVERSATION
Abstract
In this paper, I suggest that strategy research should concern
itself with continuing the conversation of the field rather than
insisting upon a place for universal methodological criteria within
that conversation. I attempt to sustain the dialogue begun by
Bourgeois, Bowman, Jemison, Huff, and others, who recommend the
pragmatic approach of methodological and theoretical pluralism as
the best way forward in increasing empirical content. I draw
heavily on the philosophical writings of Dewey, Kaplan, and Rorty
and the methodological essays of economists such as Boland,
Caldwell, and McCloskey in my effort to persuade others in the
strategy field that "good science is good conversation".

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND DETERMINISM:
SUSTAINING THE CONVERSATION
. . . once or twice she had peeped into the book her sister was
reading, but it had no pictures or conversation in it, x and what
is the use of a book, ' thought Alice, ^without pictures or
conversation?
— Lewis Carroll (1865, p. 5)
INTRODUCTION
Bourgeois persuasively argues that: "reductionism
eliminates much of the richness that characterizes the strategic
management process ..." (1984, p. 586). Similarly, Bowman (1990)
suggests that reductionism is an ever-present risk, where one
pushes roughshod over issues and constructs toward a central
paradigm. In contrast, Teece (1986) argues that strategy requires
a dominant research program and Camerer offers a "manifesto" (1985,
p.l) for rigorous, deductive policy research. While I agree
with Camerer that organizational economics and industrial
organization are worthwhile pursuits for strategy research
(Mahoney, Tang, & Thomas, 1990) , I believe that the theoretical and
methodological pluralism advocated by Bourgeois, Bowman and others
(Boland, 1982; Caldwell, 1982; Denzin, 1989; Huff, 1981; Jemison,
1981; Jick, 1979; McCloskey, 1985) is the more persuasive argument.
I want to emphasize that disagreement does not entail
disrespect. The main philosophical point, made by Plato and other
followers since, is that any criticism is better than a dismissal
or an oversight. Montgomery, Wernerfelt and Balakrishnan (M-W-B)
call for a "more active and public dialogue, including published
comments, rejoinders and criticisms" (1989, p. 194). Similarly,
Bowman (1990) submits that intellectual exchange or arguments are
quite useful and not as common yet in our field as they should be.
I am persuaded that good science is good conversation (McCloskey,
1985; Rorty, 1979), and wish to continue the dialogue begun by
Bourgeois, Bowman, Camerer, M-W-B and others.
In the first section I consider Camerer ' s proposal of a rather
narrow perspective for the strategic management field involving the
use of deductive paradigms, mathematics, and economics as the main
research tools. I express my concern that a restriction of the
field to analytically tractable questions would be
counterproductive to the future growth of strategy research.
In the second section, I consider M-W-B' s methodological
prescriptions and proposals. I suggest that M-W-B hold a view
between the pragmatist camp (Bourgeois, 1984; Bowman, 1990; Dewey,
1929; Rorty, 1979) and the logical positivist camp (Blaug, 1980;
Camerer, 1985; Popper, 1934) . I hope to persuade M-W-B, and many
others in the mid-range, to consider the positive consequences of
pragmatism and pluralism.
REDIRECTING RESEARCH IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A REPLY TO CAMERER
Caterer's major criticisms of the strategic management field
include the following:
1. The field is plagued by confusion about its basic
concepts (p. 2) .
2. The field has failed to test its theories and models
properly (pp. 2-4)
.
3. It is not clear whether the field is an art or a science
(pp. 4-5).
4. The field has placed an excessive emphasis on induction
over deduction as a method of scientific inquiry (pp. 5-7)
.
1. Confusion about basic concepts . Camerer notes that there is
no clear definition of strategy (Leontiades, 1982) and that the
exercise is futile with the "awkward grammar of English" (p. 2).
Or put differently, the dictionary is a book of circular reasoning.
What do we mean by the word "mean"? What do we mean by the word
"word"? If not for the fact that some students would take
Camerer* s objection seriously, the argument would only be funny.
Camerer fails to recognize the vagueness inherent in all concepts.
The concept of "pure" elements is a mixture of isotopes, the
concept of "absolute" temperature is measured from an approximate
zero. How much more precise are economists when they discuss an
"industry" or a "strategic group" or an "innovation" or
psychologists when they talk about "intelligence" as they
"mismeasure man"? (Gould, 1981)
.
The point is that concepts are indefinitely indefinite. This
concept of concepts does not imply that our thinking should be
fuzzy to achieve an accurate representation of a fuzzy world. What
I am suggesting is that it is possible to take a more positive view
of our conceptual fuzziness than Camerer appears inclined to.
While one may agree with Camerer that vague concepts are "a symptom
of disease" (1985, p. 2), this does not thereby diagnose a failing.
Furthermore, the demand for exactness of conceptual meaning
may have a pernicious effect. The result may be a premature
closing of the mind. After all, the concepts in terms of which we
pose our scientific questions limit the range of admissible
answers. That members of the strategic management community view
the concept of strategy differently is an essential tension for
healthy creativity. In fact, one can make the case for allowing
multiple conceptualizations of strategy to flourish, as long as
there exists an acceptable level of correspondence between the
theoretical concepts/constructs and their operationalizations/
measurements in empirical studies (Chaffee, 1985; Frederickson,
1984) .
As a reply to Camerer, I have been persuaded that strategy is
a "continuing search for rent" (Bowman, 1974, p. 74) and the
protection of these Ricardian rents via human, physical,
locational, organizational, and legal capital (Kogut, 1984; Rumelt,
1984; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984). I would be more sympathetic
to the argument that my view is too narrow (Chaffee, 1985) rather
than the contention that I am not being precise.
2. Failure to Test Models Properly . Regarding Camerer ' s second
major assertion, that the field has failed to test its theories and
models properly, his sole criterion of a "proper test" appears to
be predictive ability, although he notes that it "is not the only
test of a good theory" (1985, p. 4, emphasis in original). Camerer
articulates the philosophical view of instrumentalism, claiming
that theories are best viewed as nothing more than instruments.
Scientific models are "inference tickets" for making predictions.
Camerer (1985, p. 3) argues that: "Predictive ability should be the
fundamental test of a theory, or at least a ^mature 1 theory (Blaug,
1980) , often at the expense of surface realism or truth of
assumptions (Friedman, 195(3))".
Several arguments have been made against instrumentalism. I
will discuss four arguments here (the first two are addressed by
Camerer)
.
While the first three arguments against instrumentalism
I find unpersuasive, the fourth argument against instrumentalism
I believe is compelling:
A) The emerging field of strategic management should not
be subjected to the empirical scrutiny appropriate
for a mature discipline.
B) Prediction does not guarantee understanding.
C) Why should we take a model seriously when the author
uses egregiously false assumptions?
D) Prediction (falsification) is impossible.
Camerer dismisses the first argument as a self-serving
protectionist stance. I concur. I believe that the strategy field
is virile enough to avoid the tendency to immunize theories against
criticism. Strategy research does not need a defensive methodology
(Blaug, 1980)
.
Camerer ' s second argument raises doubts about the symmetry
thesis in the writings of Hempel (1966) . The symmetry thesis is
that explanation is simply "prediction written backwards". Camerer
notes that this symmetry thesis is incorrect. He submits that:
"prediction does not guarantee understanding". I concur. It is
only too obvious that prediction does not guarantee explanation.
Students crank out countless tables of highly significant t-
statistics from garbage-can regressions, where the only discernible
rationale appears to be the maximization of adjusted R-square.
I would also point out that explanation does not guarantee
prediction. Darwinian theory is a standard example. Thus,
prediction need not imply explanation and explanation need not
provide prediction. One may attack Camerer ' s instrumentalist view
by arguing that strategic management ought to do better than merely
predict accurately. Nagel (1961, p. 4) argues that: "it is the
organization and classification of knowledge on the basis of
explanatory principles that is the distinctive goal of the
sciences". Popper rejects instrumentalism as untenable because it
does not urge scientists to practice a critical methodology; it is
satisfied with high correlation and does not push the scientist to
consider fuller explanation (1965, p. 103).
Camerer, while seeming to acknowledge this point, does not
back down from his instrumentalist stance. I submit that there is
no inconsistency here since Camerer ' s acceptance of Friedman's
(1953) "as-if" formulation positively rules out the possibility of
causal explanation. In short, instrumentalism is its own defense,
and perhaps its only defense (Boland, 1979, p. 522). Toulmin (1972)
provides an eloquent defense of instrumentalism against the attacks
of Nagel and Popper. There are two other major objections that
Camerer did not consider in his paper.
The third criticism against instrumentalism is that models
with false assumptions may automatically be dismissed. This is
the philosophical view of the ultra-empiricist (Blaug, 1980) who
insists on testing each assumption of the model. I emphatically
take issue with this stance and on this score remain in Camerer 's
camp. To reject a paper on the sole ground that its assumptions
cannot be tested is uninformed.
In fact, to reject a paper on the sole basis that its
assumptions are false is unwarranted. To make the statement that
"the author's false assumptions thus lead to false conclusions" is
a non sequitur. We may argue in favor of the conclusion from the
truth of the assumptions (modus ponens) or we may argue against the
truth of an assumption by the falsity of a conclusion (modus
tollens) . However, truth cannot be passed backwards and falsity
cannot be passed forwards.
That a model does not have a one-to-one correspondence with
the world is why we call it theory. Metaphorically speaking, a
theory may be thought of as a road map in which a larger more
A realistic' map may be of less guidance than a smaller
( ^unrealistic' ) map. In fact, a map of Illinois that was the
exact size and shape of Illinois would be very realistic but of no
utility in helping us find our way. To apply this metaphor to
economics, the assumption that human beings have perfect
rationality may be an ^unrealistic ' premise but does not damn the
whole economic literature (Friedman, 1953) . Counter-intuitive and
apparently refuted assumptions may lead to useful conclusions.
Some in strategy insist that researchers use true assumptions,
while on the other hand an overwhelming majority of economists
mandate that researchers use false (perfect rationality)
assumptions. I find the former view uninformed and the latter
stance excessively dogmatic. I suggest that papers that assume
perfect rationality, bounded rationality, enacted rationality or
come up with an idiosyncratic X-rationality may each provide
insight.
To summarize, I have found the first three arguments against
Camerer's instrumentalism unpersuasive. However, the fourth
argument, which Camerer fails to address, I find quite damaging:
Prediction (falsification) is impossible in economics and strategic
management.
The industry of making predictions, including economists and
strategic management researchers, earns merely normal returns
(McCloskey, 1985) . Camerer alludes to the "specification problem"
(1985, p. 4) of hypotheses that are indistinguishable given the
available data. I want to argue here that the real insights come
from "intuition" and "grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967)
rather than deductive reasoning and empirical testing.
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Consider the following example: I am a researcher in
education and am concerned with improving the French-test scores
of students in an elementary school (grades 1-8) . Being a freshly
minted Ph.D. student indoctrinated in the reductionist tradition
I am espousing my theory that: French test scores = F (Weight)
.
I run my regression and find that the weight variable is positive
and significant. I make a policy recommendation that the students
should have two double malteds each day to improve their test
scores. One of my colleagues suggests that I may have left out a
significant variable, that being the age of the child. I rerun my
regression: French test scores= F( Weight, Age) and find that the
weight variable is negative and significant. I reverse my policy
recommendation and suggest that students be given salads at lunch
to reduce their weight and thereby improve their test scores.
Another colleague points out to me that the boys in the school
tend to take math, while the girls (who weigh relatively less than
the boys of the same age) tend to take languages and that this may
explain the negative coefficient that I obtained. I rerun the
regression: French test scores = F (Weight, Age, DUMMY) . The DUMMY
variable is set to 1 if the student has taken French and is set to
otherwise. Now the weight variable is insignificant. Age and
whether the person has taken French lessons explain much more of
the variance in French test scores than does the weight variable
(for more sophisticated examples of the "identification problem"
from a professional econometrician, see Learner, 1983)
.
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Now in this model we can follow by intuition the problems of
mispecification error and yet with phenomena we know much less
about we put great confidence in our estimates of a variables'
significance. Nelson Goodman notes that: "Truth, far from being
a solemn and severe master, is a docile and obedient servant. The
scientist who supposes that he is single-mindedly dedicated to the
search for truth (via falsifiability) deceives himself ... He as
much decrees as discovers the laws he sets forth, as much designs
as discerns the patterns he delineates" (1978, p. 18). Kuhn noted
that: "the scientist often seems rather to be struggling with
facts, trying to force them into conformity with a theory he does
not doubt" (1977, p. 193). In practice there is not much falsifying
going on.
The fact of the matter is that the scientific community has
Bayesian a priori beliefs that impact on what empirical results
they will accept. Thus, for a time a community of scholars might
reject "solid" results, for instance that transaction costs impact
on the vertical integration decision, and accept "feeble" ones, for
instance that market share leads to higher profitability. The
beliefs can be reversed without changing the example.
There is another problem with the falsif iability thesis that
Camerer advocates, namely, that it fails to recognize that all
facts are theory laden and all theories are value laden. No
guillotine humanly devised can sharply split facts and values.
The contents of observation itself cannot be free from conceptual
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contamination. A scientific theory is a system of concepts,
hypotheses and observations that are inextricably intertwined.
The denial of objectivity in social science is more common in
sociology than in economics. However, one Noble prize winner in
economics, Gunnar Myrdal, went against the stream in arguing for
the concept of value-impregnated social science. Myrdal" s (1970)
solution is not to suppress value judgments but rather to state
them at the outset. Pretending to separate normative and positive
statements is self-deception. To argue that good scientists
practice the objective criterion of falsification is pure fiction.
Camerer's insensitivity to values that are implicit within
theories is evident when he states that: "the concept of
equilibrium, (is) a state in which everyone is happy and nobody
can improve their lot" (1985, p. 7). In point of fact, an optimal,
efficient equilibrium may exist in which one person has virtually
all the wealth and everyone else is at the subsistence level. I
would hardly say that "everyone is happy" by this dismal outcome.
An efficient market equilibrium is also a mechanism of denial.
There is no happiness or justice (Rawlsian or otherwise) implied
by equilibrium.
I would argue that the claim that knowledge can be free from
doubt, metaphysics, morals, and personal convictions is self-
deception of the most hurtful kind. Scientific knowledge is no
different from personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1962) . Trying to make
it different by setting up arbitrary standards (and the criterion
11
of falsif icationism is as ad hoc as any) "if rigorously practiced
would lead us all of voluntary imbecility" (1962, p. 88).
If one finds this sweeping argument against the falsif iability
thesis unpersuasive, then consider the following arguments: First,
chance is the ever-present alternative that spoils falsification.
Second, the possibility is always present that the experiment was
not properly controlled. Third, as my French test model
illustrated, there is the identification problem. Fourth, tests
of models are not tests of theories. Fifth, the French physicist
Duhem (1906) and the philosopher Quine (1953) have correctly
pointed out that an experiment can never condemn an isolated
hypothesis.
Suppose that the hypothesis H (that related diversification
leads to higher profitability in May, 1990) implies a testing
observation O (an increase in the Palepu measure of related
diversification indicates that ROI increases) . Only the addition
of ancillary hypotheses HI, H2 , H3 and so forth makes measurement
possible (HI = the theory applies to the United States for 1981-
1989; H2= industry effects do not confound the results; H3=
interactions of importance have been controlled for; and so forth)
.
Thus, not-0 implies not H — or not HI or not H2 or not H3 or any
number of failures of premises irrelevant to the main hypothesis
in question.
Popper himself has endorsed Duhem' s irrefutability thesis
(1965, p. 50) . It takes many premises to reach a conclusion. When
a conclusion is shown to be false it is impossible to pin down the
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hypothesis that is the culprit. An experiment can never condemn
an isolated hypothesis but only a whole theoretical group.
Ancillary hypotheses insulate a hypothesis from a crucial test.
Falsification, near enough, has been falsified (McCloskey, 1985)
.
As a voice of pragmatism, I would argue that usefulness is as
valid a judge of a framework's cogency as its predictive power.
The validity of a framework depends upon the consequences of acting
upon it. Alice, as she was falling down the rabbit's hole asked
"do cats eat bats?" or do "bats eat cats?" (Carroll, 1865, p. 9).
She noted that she couldn't answer either question and thus, it
didn't much matter which way she put it. Alice was a pragmatist.
There is no difference, that makes a difference between, "it works
because it's true", and "it's true because it works" (Rorty, 1982).
Rules of rationality derived from deductive models that are not
backed by executable algorithms are a worthless currency (Simon,
1982) . Or put differently, they don't work.
While methodological falsif icationism is a noble quest, it
would be a tragic mistake if its name were invoked as an
incantation for rejecting other social scientists' works. Camerer
suggests that: "Most models or frameworks in policy research, if
tried before the stern judge of predictiveness and her sterner
cousin, relative predictiveness, would be convicted and be
sentenced to perish rather than be published" (1985, p. 3). Why do
strategic management researchers have to defend their framework by
this ad hoc criterion, and before what tribunal? I ask along with
McCloskey: "Why do we need methodological rules to govern me and
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thee enforced by an intellectual hue and cry in which we will stone
thee if thou resisteth and expel thee from the tribe?" (1985,
p. 23). A methodological authoritarian is a Red Queen: you broke
the methodological rules, "off with your head".
The point I want to emphasize is that hard working, honest
and sensitive scholars make methodology great rather than adherence
to methodological rules making scholars great. Strategic
management, like any "mature" field, should get its standards of
argument from itself.
The search for the absolute paradigm is the search for
absolute conformism. Any method that encourages uniformity is a
method of deception. "It enforces an unenlightened conformism and
speaks of truth; it results in the deterioration of intellectual
capabilities, of the power of imagination and speaks of deep
insight" (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 45). The price of such
methodological training would be a trained incapacity.
I fundamentally challenge the notion that a static set of
procedural rules for the appraisal of theories or for the
definition of appropriate theoretical structure has ever been, or
should ever be, followed by researchers in their attempts to gain
knowledge. Persuaded by Rorty (1979, 1982, 1987), I openly
guestion the whole epistemological exercise. The preoccupation
with methodological standards is self-defeating and the motives of
the exercise may be viewed primarily as an attempt to eternalize
a certain contemporary language-game, social practice or self-image
(Rorty, 1979)
.
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I hold then that a rules-oriented methodology is self-
deceptive and objectionable. The desire for methodological rules
is a desire for certainty and is a cowardly "escape from freedom"
(Fromm, 1941) . I believe that Bourgeois, following Dewey (1929)
,
is correct when he states that: "the ubiguitous guest for the
reduction of uncertainty" (1984, p. 587) is driven by the need for
psychological security. I also believe that Bourgeois is correct
in noting that the pursuit of deterministic solutions forces
reductionism. However, once this idea has become conscious, we may
come to realize that the sense of closure (while satisfying because
it is preceded by the tension of perplexity) is self-deception.
A methodological authoritarian, while perhaps having the
intentions of a benevolent dictator, blocks the path of inguiry.
I have little doubt that Kaplan said it better: "The conflict
between freedom and control is an existential dilemma for science,
whatever it may be for society at large. Yet for science, at any
rate, it seems to me that reason reguires that we push always for
freedom, freedom even for the thought that we enlightened ones so
clearly see to be mistaken" (1964, p. 377).
Over a hundred years ago the economist Jevons suggested that
mutiny in the field of social science would increase the nation's
bounty: "In matters of philosophy and science authority has ever
been the great opponent of truth. A despotic calm is usually the
triumph of error. In the republic of the sciences sedition and
even anarchy are beneficial in the long-run to the greatest
happiness of the greatest number" (Jevons, 1871, pp. 275-276) .
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While the words sound threatening, I emphasize that the ideas
expressed should not be considered menacing to the post-Kuhnian
scholar. In fact, I believe that moving away from a rules-based
"reductionist" methodology is consistent with an open, plural, and
pragmatic community. Greater epistemological appreciation provides
a basis for methodological understanding and tolerance of diversity
and multiciplicity in research design (Evered and Louis, 1981)
.
Why should anyone feel threatened by tolerance and understanding?
Strategic management scholars need not conform to a central
paradigm nor decree inflexible methodological principles; on the
contrary an ungroundable but vital sense of human solidarity in
our intellectual community may develop and deepen by the
acknowledgement and acceptance of the right to differ (Rorty,
1982) . Rorty (1987) has persuaded me that a group of scholars may
respect the contingencies of language, of selfhood, and of a
liberal community.
3 . Strategy: Art or Science? Camerer seems caught up with the
demarcation criterion of determining science from non-science. My
position is that the question is moot. One may read endless
debates on whether economics is a science in the economics journals
from the late 1890 's to the present. If I make any contribution
to the field, I would urge that we not divert scarce resources to
this demarcation problem in strategy. I suggest that strategic
management is important and I am profoundly indifferent to the
science vs. non-science "war of the words". In fact, my position
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is that there is no meaningful way to separate science from non-
science, so that the demarcation problem posed by Camerer, and
which is so important to an economist such as Blaug (1980) , is a
pseudo-problem. The demarcation problem serves chiefly to
demarcate "us from them" and appeals to those that desire a nobler
self-image.
While I share Camerer ' s enthusiasm for the use of decision
theory, game theory and industrial organization, I would also argue
for the inclusion of psychology, organization theory, sociobiology,
sociology, history and institutional analysis (Bowman, 1990) . The
strategic management scholar should not discriminate on the basis
of race, creed, or epistemological origin. The interaction of
individuals, possessing different knowledge and different views is
what constitutes the life of thought and the lifeblood of advances
in strategy formulation.
Camerer argues that: "Unfortunately, policy approaches do not
seem to pass these tests of time; knowledge in policy analysis is
neither timeless nor cumulative" (1985, p. 4). First, I suggest
that the search for timeless knowledge is the Cartesian quest for
timeless certainty over the quest for wisdom (Dewey, 1929) . The
noted economist Sir John Hicks argued that (1976, p. 208) :
Since it is a changing world that we are studying, a theory
which illumines the right things now may illumine the wrong
things another time. This may happen because of changes in
the world (the things neglected may have grown relative to
the things considered) or because of changes in the source
of information (the sorts of facts that are readily
accessible to us may have changed) or because of changes in
ourselves (the things in which we are most interested may
have changed)
. There is, there can be, no economic theory
which will do for us everything we want all the time.
17
I conclude that strategic management cannot be timeless, which
is the special reason why strategy is prone to paradigm shifts.
Universality is qualified by specificity, immutable verities are
challenged by recognition of changing patterns of investigation and
patterns of thought; logical analysis is checked by the study of
history.
Second, in the post-Kuhnian age I question whether knowledge
is cumulative. Indeed, Kuhn's thesis is that the textbooks of
science which tell a story of how the field has progressed by a
cumulative process is pure fiction. Kuhn's (1970) classic on the
nature and significance of scientific revolutions is much cited
and little read. Feyerabend (1975) develops further the thesis
that the claim that new theories incorporate older theories is
largely a myth.
Camerer (1985, p.l) also discusses metaphor in a pejorative
manner. Camerer fails to appreciate that most of our convictions
in life, let alone strategic management, are driven by metaphor
(Morgan, 1986) . In fact metaphors are central to our
epistemological beliefs (such as the Lockean notion of the "mind
as a mirror") . Rorty maintains that: "It is pictures rather than
propositions, metaphors rather than statements which determine most
of our philosophical convictions" (1979, p. 12).
In strategy, an inevitable debate is emerging on whether we
follow the metaphor of equilibrium derived from physics or the
metaphor of Darwinian evolution (Alchian, 1950) as the proper image
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for understanding our "institutions of capitalism" (Williamson,
1985) . It should also be noted that models are metaphors, and
"game theory" (which Camerer espouses) by its very name suggests
a metaphor. A game theorist may begin his or her seminar by
suggesting to the audience that they "consider the strategic
interactions of Folgers and Maxwell House as a two-person, zero-
sum x game'". The real world interaction between firms is said to
be "like" a game-theoretic model. In agency theory a firm is
"like" a nexus of contracts.
Black has pointed out that: "a memorable metaphor has the
power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional
relation by using language directly appropriate to one as a lens
for seeing the other" (1962, p. 236). The economist McCloskey
suggests that: "Perhaps thinking is metaphorical. Perhaps to
remove metaphor is to remove thought" (1983, p. 503).
Perhaps Camerer views metaphorical argument as sophistry and
that mere persuasion is unpersuasive. According to Camerer, we
must be more "rigorous". It should be noted that many social
scientists become quite defensive when it is suggested that their
discipline is based on consensus rather than the hard, objective
truth of the natural sciences. The usual response is to
demonstrate how the field has enforced stringent methodological
principles to be more "objective". This defensive attitude is due,
in part, to the premise that the natural sciences are not based on
"mere" consensus.
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However, even in the field of mathematics where the Cartesian
quest for the indubitable is said to reach its fulfillment, some
highly respected mathematicians have suggested that their field is
also determined by consensus (Davis and Hersh, 1981) . Kline (1980,
p. 6) notes that there is no rigorous definition of rigor. Even
mathematical proofs are not timeless. They temporarily satisfy
their reviewers in a conversation.
Camerer has written an article which appeals to a social,
nonepistemological standard of persuasion by the very act of trying
to persuade the strategic management audience that mere persuasion
is not enough. I also note that Camerer uses the "unscientific"
metaphor of the tortoise and hare to argue for the choice of
deduction over induction as the best way forward in strategic
management. My point is not to criticize Camerer and recommend
that he attempt the impossible by avoiding metaphor. I submit that
Camerer ' s writing style is charming and that he should not feel
uncomfortable by possessing these glorious skills of our humanity
as "awkward" as they may be.
Finally, I come back again to the pragmatic voice of John
Dewey (1929) who suggested that we eliminate the distinction
between art, science and philosophy. Also the "poetic" genius
Einstein found the distinction between art and science absurd. He
eloquently stated the commonality of art and science in the
following way:
One of the strongest motives that lead men to art and
science is escape from everyday life ... A finely tempered
nature longs to escape from personal life into the world of
objective perception and thought. . . .Man tries to make for
20
himself in the fashion that suits him best a simplified and
intelligible picture of the world; he then tries to some
extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of
experience, and thus to overcome it. This is what the
painter, the poet, the speculative philosopher and the
scientist do, each in his own fashion (1934, p. 2).
4. Induction versus Deduction . Camerer ' s 4th major concern
involves the induction-deduction puzzle. I regard the inductive-
deductive debate as a pseudo-problem; it cannot be solved even
within the context of the framework in which it is posed.
Induction/deduction is not a useful dichotomy. Induction and
deduction are inextricably intertwined (Hunt, 1983; Wallace, 1969).
Does Camerer use inductive or deductive reasoning in making his
case for deductive reasoning?
Even granting Camerer ' s premise that the induction/deduction
dichotomy is useful as a demarcation criterion, my position on this
matter was probably best put by the English economic historian T.
5. Ashton (1971, p. 177)
:
The whole discussion as to whether deduction or induction is
the proper method to use in the social sciences is, of
course, juvenile: it is as though we were to debate whether
it were better to hop on the right foot or on the left.
Sensible men with two feet know they are likely to make
better progress if they walk on both.
A strategic management professor hopping along without an
inductive leg, unless he or she is a decathlon athlete, will have
a narrow perspective and little ability to apply strategy to
complex issues. Ashton' s metaphor may be applied to the
process/content debate in strategy as well (Mahoney, 1990)
.
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STRATEGY CONTENT AND THE RESEARCH PROCESS: A REPLY TO
MONTGOMERY, WERNERFELT AND BALAKRISHNAN
Montgomery, Wernerfelt, and Balakrishnan (M-W-B, 1989)
provide a provocative methodological paper for the strategic
management audience to encourage soul-searching on the research
process. They also explicitly encourage others that see things
differently to present their views. I take up their invitation.
M-W-B begin their argument by suggesting that: "research
progress is a continuous expansion of knowledge involving the
generation, refutation, and application of theories" (1989, p.
189) . I would like to raise some doubts about whether it is
"continuous" and suggest that "progress" is a problematic concept.
Kuhn (1970, 1977) provides a persuasive argument that science
does not progress in a continuous fashion. Kuhn suggests that
science develops in a discontinuous manner and that historical
misconstructions render scientific revolutions invisible. Kuhn
suggests that: "the member of a mature scientific community is,
like the typical character of Orwell's 1984, the victim of a
history rewritten by the powers that be" (1970, p. 167).
Of course, once we question the continuity argument, we may
also begin to question what is meant by "progress". Do we achieve
progress by continuing "normal science" or by choosing a new
paradigm or perhaps by adopting multiple paradigms? I believe that
theoretical pluralism (Boland, 1982; Bowman, 1990; Caldwell, 1982)
is the most cogent argument and that empirical content is enhanced
in the process.
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Kuhn's thesis makes me skeptical that adopting a central
paradigm is the enlightened view. Kuhn argues that it is rather
presumptuous to believe that the adoption of a new paradigm is any
closer to the "truth" than the older paradigm. Kuhn maintains
that: "There are losses as well as gains in scientific revolutions,
and scientists tend to be peculiarly blind to the former" (1970,
p. 167).
I also believe that M-W-B's five propositions (1989, pp. 190-
191) require closer scrutiny:
1. All theory generation should depend on some past observation.
2. All observations should be guided and interpreted through
some theory.
3. A theory is better, ceteris paribus, (a) if it is refutable
and (b) if it is consistent with a body of existing theories.
4. A good test is one that can refute an explicit theory.
5. The sciences should be undertaken for the sake of ultimate
application.
I would argue that the first two propositions do not require the
word "should". Thus I maintain that: (1) All theory generation
necessarily depends on some past observations and that (2) All
observations are necessarily guided and interpreted through some
theory.
The first proposition is one that Einstein (1934) repeatedly
emphasized. Science must start with facts (observations) and end
with facts (observations) . This pragmatic proposition is sometimes
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called "epistemic empiricism" (Kaplan, 1964) . We cannot know
without depending on experience.
The second proposition suggests that "believing is seeing".
As my conversation with Camerer suggested: "all facts
(observations) are theory-laden". There can be no immaculate
perception. As Hanson noted: "There is more to seeing than meets
the eyeball" (1965, p. 7).
With the distinction that I would replace the "ought"
statements by "is" statements in propositions 1 and 2, I am in
agreement with the spirit of M-W-B's argument. However, in
proposition 3, I challenge both parts (a) and (b)
.
I have already articulated my skepticism with Popper's
falsif iability thesis in my discussion with Camerer. I simply make
the additional point that if M-W-B take their first two
propositions seriously then there can be no theory-neutral
observational facts to refute a theory. This of course, is the
crux of Kuhn's attack on Popper's falsification thesis. I suggest
that M-W-B's first three propositions provide an interesting
paradox for the strategic management audience: How can we demand
the vigorous testing of theories in terms of their observable
predictions, while at the same time granting that all observations
are theory-laden?
I am persuaded that since all facts are theory-laden, if we
want more facts, then we need more theories. This is
Feyerabend's (1975) "principle of proliferation". If different
"conceptual lenses" (Allison, 1971) magnify, highlight and reveal
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as well as blur and neglect salient "realities" then why must we
choose between alternative models? Students that go about trying
to falsify two of Allison's three models to explain the Cuban
Missile Crisis have really missed the whole point of what Allison's
book was trying to communicate.
In the strategy literature one of the common questions of the
day is the "so what" question. What difference does your view
make? The answer I submit is the following: I wholeheartedly
believe that Allison provides us with a fundamental historical
lesson. In a nuclear age, it is critical that we train people to
utilize "multilectic inquiry" (Huff, 1981) . Theoretical pluralism,
tolerance and understanding makes "groupthink" less likely in our
leaders, in our organizations, and in ourselves (academe)
.
Having articulated some of the views of Myrdal above, it seems
only fitting that I explicate the views of the co-winner of the
1974 Nobel prize in economics, Friedrich Hayek. Hayek argued that
it was no exaggeration that once the more active part of the
intellectual community has been converted to a set of beliefs, the
process by which these become generally accepted is almost
automatic and irreversible. He argued that the process of opinion
forming by intellectuals depends on freedom of thought and
expression. The ideal of democracy rests on the belief that the
view which will direct government emerges from an independent and
spontaneous process. The best intellectual design comes about by
the free competition of individuals, not by coalitions or
collectives that plan on espousing homogenous half-truths. A
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"manifesto" that delineates a methodological plan for us all to
follow is ill advised. If the academic community attempts to
consciously control the intellectual process then we may well be
on the road to serfdom (Hayek, 1944)
.
I also have some reservations that a theory is better if it
is consistent with a body of existing theories. I am in accord
with M-W-B as a personal faith but I (as a reviewer of a paper)
would not hold others to this standard. I think it is legitimate
to ask: Why should we demand consistency? Kaplan (1964, pp. 314-
315) expressed this idea eloquently:
Coherence is a conservative principle which ruthlessly
suppresses as rebellion any movement of thought which might
make for a scientific revolution. The unyielding insistence
that every new theory must fit those theories already
established is characteristic of closed systems of thought,
not of science.
In proposition 4, M-W-B suggest that a good test is one
that can refute an explicit theory. I argue that no such test
exists. M-W-B suggest that a theory that proposes that:
a
X = X In X +bX , b>012 3 4
"stands or falls on the result of a single test" (1989, p. 191).
The view that a theory can be refuted by a single test is referred
to by Blaug as "naive falsificationism" (1980, pp. 26-27) . Popper,
whom M-W-B cite approvingly, while being accused of being a "naive
falsif icationist" , has advocated Duhem's irrefutability thesis
(1965, p. 50)
:
In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can
ever be produced, for it is always possible to say that the
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experimental results are not reliable, or that the
discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the
experimental result and the theory are only apparent and
that they will disappear with the advance of our
understanding
.
In my search for understanding, I have reached the following
tentative conclusion: Not only is affirmation impossible, which is
the consensus of most social scientists, but refutation is also
impossible. This realization opens my mind to be more tolerant
rather than leading me to despair. In a world of chance,
scientists must take their chances. While affirmation may be
impossible, we affirm that we shall meet in San Francisco for the
Academy of Management meetings in August, 1990. While refutation
may be impossible, tests do influence our Bayesian priors and
perhaps for the better.
This conclusion that I reached, I have since found out is not
so "new". Richard Lipsey in his second edition of the popular
text: An Introduction to Positive Economics , long ago reached the
conclusion that I now hold. Lipsey argued that (1966, p. xx)
:
I have abandoned the Popperian notion of refutation and have
gone over to the statistical view of testing that accepts
that neither refutation nor confirmation can ever be final,
and that all we can hope to do is discover on the basis of
finite amounts of imperfect knowledge what is the balance of
probabilities among existing hypotheses.
M-W-B in their fifth proposition assert that "the sciences
should be undertaken for the sake of ultimate application" (1989,
p. 191) . I concur. The pragmatist suggests that the truth or
validity of an idea depends upon the consequences of acting upon
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it. Pragmatism explicitly makes action the primary context of all
meaning and value (Dewey, 1929). This is pragmatism's conception
of truth in strategic management.
While being in almost total agreement with Camerer and M-W-B
on the articles that they cite as exemplary work that illustrate
the health and vitality of strategic management, I fundamentally
disagree with their "worldview" . I suggest two rudimentary factors
that lead to my dissent.
First, I lean more toward the rationalist persuasion while M-
W-B, and particularly Camerer, have an empiricist orientation
(Bowman, 1990) . Bowman (1990) defines the rationalist persuasion
as viewing the mind as actively organizing experiences on the basis
of pre-existing schemes. The empiricist, on the other hand, treats
mental processes as a reflection of information obtained from the
environment. Or as Rorty (1979) puts it, the empiricist holds the
Lockean metaphor of the "mind as a mirror of nature" . I see M-W-B
recognizing the rationalist perspective in their early propositions
but then pulling back to the empiricist view.
I hold the view that scientific statements are not true or
false of some external, independently existing "reality" but rather
are creations or constructions of the human mind. I am sensitive
now to the notion that agreed facts are theory-laden making the
choice between theories problematic and I deny the existence of
rational, universally valid criteria for the evaluation of
scientific inquiry. "Truth" is a fifth wheel. The question what
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is "truth" is replaced by: "How do we come to endow experience with
meaning?" (Bruner, 1986)
.
To paraphrase Herbert Simon (1982, p. 441), strategic
management is one of the sciences of the artificial. Scientific
propositions are artificial creations. To maintain that scientific
observations are descriptions of the world based on the
generalization of experiments is the "myth of the scientist".
Dewey (1929) suggested that "truth" be replaced by "warranted
assertability" and that there are no assertions immune from
revision.
Second, I believe that Camerer and M-W-B have been strongly
influenced by the writings of the young Karl Popper. M-W-B cite
two of Popper's works and Camerer, while not citing Popper
directly, does cite two of Popper's most ardent followers in
economics (Blaug, 1980; Friedman, 1953). M-W-B and especially
Camerer, advocate Popper's methodological principles. I would
suggest however that reference to philosophical authority on these
matters is a tactical error. Many philosophers such as Polanyi,
Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, Kaplan, and even the
older Popper (1970) have raised serious questions about logical
positivism (Ayer, 1959) and reductionism.
My message then is not comforting to those who prefer that
methodology offer a rigorous, objective, prescriptive framework.
In fact I am offering a nonprescription. Criteria of elegance,
multiple connectedness, intuitive plausibility, simplicity,
predictive power, generality, realism, and so forth are based on
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metaphysical assumptions. For example, the attempt to define
precisely what is meant by "simple" have failed (Hempel, 1966, pp.
40-45) . Are models of perfect rationality more "simple" than
models of bounded rationality? Herbert Simon (1982, p. 476) in
his Nobel prize acceptance speech noted that Occam's razor (accept
the simplest theory that works) has a double edge. Succinctness
of statement is not the only measure of a theory's simplicity.
I am not a "relativist" claiming that two incompatible
statements are equally good but rather I am submitting that the
grounds for choosing between such opinions are less algorithmic
than has been claimed. In the same way that Bourgeois, Bowman,
Huff and others argue for theoretical and methodological pluralism,
I am arguing for pluralism in "how we explain". The principle of
the autonomy of inquiry should not be compromised. I envisage the
strategic management community as a paradigm of the open society.
In my view the virtue of Rorty's philosophy, following Dewey
(1929) , is that it exemplifies a nonepistemological philosophy in
which good science is good conversation (McCloskey, 1985)
.
The quest for certainty is not the quest for wisdom (Dewey,
1929) . Wisdom consists in the ability to sustain a conversation.
Conversational justification is naturally holistic, whereas the
notion of justification embedded in the epistemological tradition
is reductive and atomistic (Rorty, 1982) . To use a popular
metaphor, the "rules of the game" are conversational norms: don't
lie; pay attention; cooperate; don't shout; let other people talk;
30
be open-minded; explain yourself when asked; don't resort to
violence or conspiracy in aid of your ideas (McCloskey, 1985) .
To conclude this essay in persuasion, I would like to provide
the reader with Oakeshott s observations on "the voice of poetry
in the conversation of mankind". A message that I would apply to
scientific dialogue as well (Oakeshott, 1962, pp. 198-202):
In a conversation the participants are not engaged in an
inguiry or a debate; there is no "truth" to be discovered no
proposition to be proved, no conclusion sought . . . Nobody asks
where they have come from or on what authority they are
present . . . Their is no symposiarch or arbiter, not even a
doorkeeper to examine credentials. Every entrant is taken at
face-value and everything is permitted which can get itself
accepted into the flow of speculation. And voices which speak
in conversation do not compose a hierarchy. Conversation is
not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a
contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of
exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure. ... As
civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an
inguiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating
body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the
primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the
course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both
in public and within ourselves. ... Education, properly
speaking, is an invitation into the skill and partnership of
this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices,
to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which
we acguire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to
conversation ... (I)n its participation in the conversation
each voice learns to be playful, learns to understand itself
conversationally and to recognize itself as a voice among
voices.
To the eloguent conversation provided by Bourgeois, Bowman,
Huff, McCloskey, Oakeshott, Rorty and others, I would like to add
an additional comment, if I may. Strategy research should concern
itself with continuing the conversation of the field rather than
insisting upon a place for universal methodological criteria within
that conversation. If as members of the strategic management
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community we do not joyfully discuss our ideas and if we are
excessively concerned about the reaction of the "professionals"
then we are abandoning hope for an open pluralistic dialogue and
we will have only ourselves to blame. The end result would be not
only poor conversation but also poor science.
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